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RESERVATIONS TO THE CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN AND THE CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS"
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948,
constituted a "common standard of achievement."2 The declaration,
however, did not set out human rights norms that were binding
in law-this was a bold step that the organization's members were
unprepared to take at that time. Since 1948, the adoption of
international treaties, whose ratification has become increasingly
widespread, has been instrumental in fulfilling the promise of the
Declaration. An example of the immense success of international
human rights law can be seen in the rapid and virtually univer-
sal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.3
Adopted at the end of 1989, this document is now binding upon
virtually every state in the world, with the exception of the
United States and Somalia.4 The Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted in 1979,
currently has an impressive 156 ratifications.6
Many states, however, have accompanied the ratification of
these treaties with reservations. A reservation is a unilateral
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
that purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
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1. G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. Id. at 72.
3. GA. Res. 4425, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Seass., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989)
[hereinafter Children's Convention].
4. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General at 198-213, U.N.
Doc. ST/LE(VSERF/14, U.N. Sales No. E.96.V.5 (1996) (providing the status of treaties
through Dec. 31, 1995)[hereinafter Multilateral Treaties]. See also infra pp. 13-17 and
notes 51-72; <http//www.unorg/Dept*/Ieaty/> (last modified May 12, 1997) (providing the
texts of the most recent reservations, declarations and objections to human rights treaties
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations).
5. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
Women's Convention].
6. See id., 1249 U.N.T.S at 80-120 (providing list of signatory countries). See also
Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 167-83 (providing updated status of ratifications).
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provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.7 The
practice of formulating reservations to multilateral human rights
treaties emerged after the adoption of the first human rights
treaty in the United States system, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in 1948.8
As this Convention had no provision expressly authorizing
reservations, some states contested their validity.9 States argued
that because the reservations were, in their view, illegal, the
reserving state was not a party to the treaty. The International
Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the subject,
declaring that "an objection to a minor reservation" should not
have the effect of invalidating the ratification.10 The court added,
however, that the right to make reservations was not without
limits, and that the reservations would only be acceptable if they
were compatible with the "object and purpose" of the
Convention." This rule, along with other legal principles
concerning the effect of reservations, was later codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 12
A perception has surfaced that the practice of entering
reservations to human rights treaties has become quite excessive
in recent years. Some states accompany their ratification with
reservations that are so extensive that they render the ratification
virtually meaningless. Observers fear that tolerating this practice
will undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the treaties
themselves. Critics note two responses to these concerns. First,
several states parties to the treaties have reacted to abusive
reservations by formulating objections. Although the Vienna
Convention recognizes the technique of formulating an objection, 3
its application to human rights treaties appears to have a more
political than a legal significance. 14 Second, bodies created by the
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 333 (art. 2 para. 1(d)) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
8. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
9. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 24 (May 28, 1951).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 19-23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-38.
13. See supra note 7, at arts. 20-22, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337-38.
14. General Comment No. 24, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., at para. 17,
U.N. Doc. CCP12I/Rev.!/Add.6 (1994) (concerning issues relating to reservations made
upon ratification or accession to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Optional
Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant), reprinted
in 15 HuM. RTs. L.J. 464, 467 (1994). But see, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
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instruments have demonstrated an increasingly aggressive
attitude against the making of reservations. 15 These treaty bodies
have called on states to withdraw reservations and, in several
cases, have plainly declared that certain reservations are
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty in
question.16
The World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna
during June, 1993, requested that states avoid resorting to
reservations and that they withdraw those that had already been
made. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 17 states:
26. The World Conference on Human Rights welcomes
progress made in the codification of human rights instru-
ments, which is a dynamic and evolving process, and urges
the universal ratification of human rights treaties. All States
are encouraged to accede to these international instruments;
all States are encouraged to avoid, as far as possible, the
resort to reservations.18
5. The World Conference on Human Rights encourages
States to consider limiting the extent of any reservations they
lodge to international human rights instruments, formulate
any reservations as precisely and narrowly as possible, ensure
that none is incompatible with the object and purpose of the
relevant treaty and regularly review any reservations with a
view to withdrawing them. 19
On the subject of reservations, the Vienna Declaration made
specific reference to the issue with respect to two international
human rights treaties, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Weapons, 1996 ICJ 93 (Jul. 8), at paras 59, 62 (last modified March 4, 1997),
<http;//www.law.corneil.edWicicj2/anw-coef.htm> (a recent advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice that stresses the importance of objections in assessing the
legality of reservations).
15. See William A. Schabas, Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties, 32
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 66-71 (1995).
16. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Comments of the Human Rights Committee, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., at
3, U.N. Doc. CCPl/C/79/Add.50 (1995).
17. Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, at 20, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.157/24,(1993) (part III, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action), reprinted
in 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 352, 356 (1993) (hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
18. Id. at 28, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. LJ. at 356 (1993).
19. Id. at 32, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. LJ. at 356-57 (1993).
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Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.21 The Vienna Declaration affirms:
39. [... w]ays and means of addressing the particularly
large number of reservations to the Convention [on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women] should be
encouraged. Inter alia, the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimina-tion Against Women should continue its review of
reserva-tions to the Convention. States are urged to withdraw
reservations that are contrary to the object and purpose of
the Convention or which are otherwise incompatible with
international treaty law.22
46. [...1 The World Conference on Human Rights urges
States to withdraw reservations to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child contrary to the object and purpose of the
Convention or otherwise contrary to international treaty law.23
This paper will examine the reservations to these two important
and heavily reserved conventions.
I. THE PRACTICE OF RESERVATIONS
Article 28 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women explicitly authorizes the
possibility of reservations:
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
receive and circulate to all States the text of reservations
made by States at the time of ratification or accession.
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose
of the present Convention shall not be permitted.
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notifica-
tion to this effect addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, who shall then inform all States
thereof. Such notification shall take effect on the date
on which it is received.2
20. Women's Convention, supra note 5.
21. Children's Convention, supra note 3.
22. Vienna Declaration, supra note 17, at 37, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. at 359
(1993).
23. Id. at 38, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. L. at 360 (1993). See also Report of the
Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N.GAOR, at 96, 99, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/
Revl, (1996) (part I, Beijing Declarationand Platform for Action), paras. 218,230c).
24. Women's Convention, supra note 5, at art. 28, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23. See Belinda
Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination
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Article 29, Paragraph 2,26 also specifically allows states
parties to make reservations to Article 29, Paragraph 1, of the
treaty. That article provides that disputes between states parties
should be settled by arbitration and, eventually, by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.26
The Convention on the Rights of the Child also includes a
provision, directly inspired by Article 28 of the Women's Conven-
tion 27 that authorizes reservations. 28 Article 51 of the Children's
Convention declares:
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
receive and circulate to all States the text of reservations
made by States at the time of ratification or accession.
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose
of the present Convention shall not be permitted.
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notifica-
tion to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, who shall then inform all States.
Such notification shall take effect on the date on which
it is received by the Secretary-General. 29
Thus, both conventions incorporate the "object and purpose"
test derived from customary law3° and codified in Article 19 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.31
Against Women, 85 AM. J. INTVL L 281, 289-302 (1991); Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forns of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA.
J. INI'L L. 643, 673-83 (1990).
25. Women's Convention, supra note 5, at art. 29, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23.
26. Id.
27. Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child, Report of the Working Group
on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th
Sess., at 43-44, U.N. Doc. FJCN.4/198&'28 (1988). See also THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVEINTON ON THE RIGHTS Op THE CuLD, A GUIDE TO THE OIRAVAUX PR1PARATOIRES" 606-09
(Sharon Detrick ed., 1992) (providing the working group's considerations of Articles 24 and
29 of the Women's Convention).
28. See Children's Convention, supra -note 3, at art. 51.
29. Id.
30. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, supra note 9, at 24.
31. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337. See
generally KAYE HOLLOWAY, LES RESERVES DANS LES TRAITS MULTLATERAUX 177-80 (1958)
(outlining the balancing adopted by the Court when it evaluated whether reservations to
the Convention against Genocide comported with the purpose of the Treaty); PIERRE-HENRI
IMBERT, LES R.SERVES AUX TRAM.S MULTARAux 63-67 (1978) (describing the Court's
analysis of the propriety of reservations as twofold: (1) define the object and the purpose
of the treaty, and (2) determine whether the reservation undermines this purpose); Nisot,
Les RAserves aux Traitds et Is Convention de Vienne du 23 mai 1969, in REVUE G9NflRALE
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Thirty-nine states parties to the Women's Convention have
made reservations to its substantive provisions.32 Brazil, Canada,
France, Ireland, Liechenstein, New Zealand, Republic of Korea,
and Thailand have since withdrawn some or all of their reserva-
tions.m Twenty-five have formulated only specific reservations to
Article 29, Paragraph 1,3 which directs states parties to conduct
dispute settlement through arbitration and through the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Seven of these specific reservations to
Article 29, Paragraph 1, have been subsequently withdrawn." Of
the thirty-six states making substantive reservations to the other
articles of the Women's Convention, fifteen are developed
countries. 36 The most problematic reservations are those which
seek to neutralize key provisions of the Convention, such as
Articles 2 and 3,37 or which neutralize the Convention as a whole
by subjecting it to the constitutional law of the state party or to
Islamic law. Eleven states have made this type of reservation:
the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libya,
Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, and Singapore." For example, the
reservation by Maldives affirms:
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuBuc 200, 201 (1973) (Charles Rousseau & Charles Valle6, eds.,
3d ed. 1973) (explaining that the state party must have the ability to make a reservation,
and the other parties to the treaty must accept the reservation, in order for the reservation
to stand); Gerard Teboul, Remarques sur les Reerves aux Conventions de Codification,
in REVUE G9N9RALE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuBuc 679, 695-701 (1982) (expanding upon
the difficulty in determining the compatability of a reservation with a treaty in light of the
fact that "object" and 'purpose" are amorphous terms and the fact that the underlying
policy for a treaty is constantly evolving); D.W. Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted
Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67 (1976-77) (emphasizing the importance of
the intent of the country to accept the treaty); John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to
Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372 (1980)
(presenting a macroscopic view of the use of reservations by States parties, rather than
concentrating on the legality of specific reservations).
32. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 169-77.
33. See id. at 181-82.
34. See id. at 169-77.
35. See id. at 180 n.4 (Czechoslovakia), 181 n.12 (U.S.S.R., Belarus, Ukraine), n.14
(Bulgaria), n.17 (Hungary), 182 n.23 (Mongolia).
36. See Members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
37. See Women's Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 2-3, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16. Article
2 condemns discrimination against all women and provides that States parties will
eliminate discrimination against women. Id. Article 3 provides that States parties shall
take appropriate measures to ensure women's opportunities for full development and
guarantee them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
equal to men. Id.
38. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 168-74.
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The Government of the Republic of Maldives will comply with
the provisions of the Convention, except those which the
Government may consider contradictory to the principles of
the Islamic Sharia upon which the laws and traditions of the
Maldives is founded.39
Furthermore, the Republic of Maldives does not see itself bound
by any provisions of the Convention that oblige it to change its
Constitution and laws in any manner.40 The Committee for the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recently declared
that such reservations are "incompatible with the object and
purpose of the present Convention."41
Five states parties have formulated reservations to Article 5
of the Women's Convention,42 which sets out an obligation to
eliminate prejudicial or stereotypical attitudes towards women.
In addition, eight states parties have reservations to Article 7,43
which deals with political rights and discrimination in public life;
fifteen states parties have reservations to Article 9," which deals
with nationality; one state party has a reservation to Article 10,45
which provides for educational rights; eight states parties have
reservations to Article 11,46 which deals with employment; four
states parties have reservations to Article 13,47 which deals with
economic matters; one state party has a reservation to Article
14,48 which discusses rights for rural women; seven states parties
have reservations to Article 15,49 which recognizes equality before
the law, the right to contract, and rights of mobility; and finally,
39. Id. at 172.
40. See id.
41. Report of the Committee for the Elimination of All Fonma of Discrimination Against
Women, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 CEDAW Report].
42. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 170 (Fiji, France, India), 172 (Malaysia,
New Zealand (Government of Cook Island).
43. See id. at 168 (Austria), 169 (Belgium), 170 (Germany), 171 (Isreal, Kuwait), 172
(Luxembourg, Malaysia), 174 (Thailand).
44. Id. at 168 (Bahamas), 169 (Cyprus, Egypt), 170 (Fiji, France), 171 (Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait), 172 (Liechtenstein, Malaysia), 183 (Morocco, Republic of Korea), 174 (Tunisia),
176 (United Kingdom).
45. See id. at 174 (Thailand).
46. See id at 168 (Australia, Austria), 171 (Ireland), 172 (Malta, Mauritius), 173 (New
Zealand), 174 (Singapore), 176 (United Kingdom).
47. See id. at 169 (Bangladesh), 171 (Ireland), 172 (Malta), 176 (United Kingdom of
Great Britian and Northern Ireland).
48. See id. at 170 (France).
49. See id. at 169 (Belgium), 171 (Ireland, Jordan), 172 (Malta), 173 (Morocco), 175
(Turkey), 176 (United Kingdom).
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twenty-one states parties have reservations to Article 16,10 which
deals with marriage and the family.
The general reservations, as well as the reservations to
Articles 7, 9, 11, 15 and 16, are suspect.51 However, as the
drafters of the Women's Convention envisioned the possibility of
reservations to the substantive provisions of the Convention, they
included Article 28 precisely for this reason. There is a strong
argument that most of the specific reservations to the various
articles are compatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention as a whole.5 2 Furthermore, states that accept the
vast majority of the obligations in the Convention are permitted
to ratify it, despite the fact that they are unwilling to accept one
or a few of the specific norms in the treaty. This is surely part
of the Convention's object and purpose.
With regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
fifty-six states parties have formulated reservations to substantive
provisions of the instrument.13 Twenty-five of these are European
or other developed countries." Nine states parties have made
general reservations, whereby the Convention is deemed to be
subject to the states parties' constitutional or Islamic laws. The
states include: Brunei Darussalem, Djibouti, Indonesia, Iran,
Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia.55  States
parties have made reservations to twenty-two of the Convention's
thirty-nine substantive articles (Article 2 through Article 40).
Article 2, which deals with non-discrimination, has had reserva-
tions made by five states parties.5 Other heavily reserved
articles include: Article 6, which deals with the right to life and
which has reservations by four states parties;57 Article 7, which
concerns the right to a name and nationality and which has
50. See id. at 168 (Bahamas), 169 (Bangladesh, Egypt), 170 (India), 171 (Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait), 172 (Lybia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius), 173
(Morocco), 174 (Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia), 175 (Turkey), 176 (United
Kingdom).
51. See Cook, supra note 24, at 687-706.
52. Members of the Committee on the Rights of the Child occasionally make
declarations recognizing the legitimacy of certain reservations. See e.g., Summary Record
of the 132nd meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th Seas., 132nd mtg., at para. 40,
U.N. Doc. CRC/CSR.132 (1994) (discussing Pakistan); Summary Record of the 226th
meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th Seas., 226th Meeting, at para. 17, U.N. Doc.
CRC/CSR.226 (1995) (discussing Tunisia).
53. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 199-208.
54. See supra note 36..
55. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 201-03, 205-07.
56. See id. at 200 (Bahamas, Belgium), 205 (Malaysia), 207 (Syria, Tunisia).
57. See id. at 201 (China), 202 (France), 204 (Luxembourg), 207 (Tunisia).
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reservations by eight states parties; s1 Article 9, which concerns
contacts between parents and children and which has reservations
by eight states parties;5 9 Article 13, which concerns freedom of
expression and which has reservations by seven states parties;
6°
Article 14, which concerns freedom of religion and which has
reservations by ten states parties;61 Article 15, which concerns
freedom of assembly and association and which has reservations
by five states parties;62 Article 17, which concerns the right to
information and which has reservations by five states parties;
63
Article 21, which concerns adoption and which has reservations
by thirteen states parties;6' Article 22, which concerns refugees
and which has reservations by six states parties;65 Article 28,
which concerns education and which has reservations by five
states parties;6 Article 37, which deals with procedural rights of
juvenile offenders and which has reservations by nine states
parties; 67 and Article 40, which deals with the detention of
juvenile offenders End which hap reservations by eight states
parties.6S
Some of the reservations to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child seek neither seek to limit the obligations of the
reserving state nor to set out interpretative principles. In several
of the reservations states parties express their view that the
Convention's terms are inadequate. Specifically, states parties do
so with respect to Article 38, Paragraph 2, which sets fifteen
58. See id. at 204 (Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg), 205 (Malaysia, Monaco), 206
(Poland), 207 (Thailand, Tunisia).
59. See id. at 201 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia), 202 (Germany), 203 (Iceland),
204 (Japan), 206 (Republic of Korea), 207 (Slovenia), 208 (Yugoslavia).
60. See id. at 200 (Algeria, Austria, Belgium), 203 (Holy See), 204 (Kiribati), 205
(Malaysia), 206 (Singapore).
61. See ic at 200 (Algeria, Bangladesh), 201 (Belgium, Brunei Darussalem), 203 (Holy
See, Indonesia), 204 (Iraq, Jordan, Kiribati), 205 (Maldives, Morocco, Netherlands), 206
(Singapore), 207 (Syria Arab Republic).
62. See id. at 200 (Austria, Belgium), 203 (Holy See), 204 (Luxembourg), 205
(Malaysia).
63. See id. at 200 (Algeria, Austria), 203 (Indonesia), 206 (Singapore), 207 (Turkey).
64. See id. at 200 (Argentina, Bangladesh), 201 (Brunei Darussalam, Canada), 202
(Egypt), 203 (Indonesia), 204 (Jordan, Kuwait), 205 (Maldives), 206 (Republic of Korea),
207 (Spain, Syria Arab Republic), 208 (Venezuela).
65. See id. at 202 (Germany), 203 (Indonesia), 205 (Malaysia, Mauritius, Netherlands),
207 (Thailand).
66. See id. at 203 (Holy See), 204 (Kiribati), 205 (Malaysia), 206 (Samoa, Singapore).
67. See id. at 200 (Australia), 201 (Canada), 203 (Iceland), 204 (Japan), 205 (Malaysia,
Netherlands), 206 (New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom of Great Britian and
Northern Ireland).
68. See id. at 200-01 (Belgium), 201 (Denmark), 202 (France, Germany), 205 (Malaysia,
Monaco), 206 (Republic of Korea), 207 (Tunisia).
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years as the minimum age for military service. This Article was
the subject of much controversy during the drafting of the
Convention.69 At the time of the treaty's ratification, Andorra,
Argentina, Austria, Columbia, Ecuador, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Spain, and Uruguay all expressed the view that
the Article provided insufficient protection for children and that
the age should be set higher than fifteen.70 With respect to the
debate about abortion, an issue on which the Convention is
prudently mute (aside from an intentionally ambiguous provision
in the preamble),71 several states parties have used declarations
to express differing views on the subject. For example, Argentina,
Ecuador, Guatemala and the Holy See insist upon protection for
the unborn child.72 In contrast, China, France, Luxembourg and
Tunisia speak of the legitimacy of their own legislation permitting
abortion. 73 The United Kingdom declares that the Convention
only protects children from the moment of live birth.74
II. OBJECTIONS BY STATES PARTIES
Both Conventions allow reservations in terms that evoke the
relevant provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. 75 Nevertheless, the two instruments do not expressly
incorporate the entire Vienna Convention reservations regime. To
the extent that the Vienna Convention regime may be applicable
to human rights treaties, the presumption arises that it is
implicitly incorporated into the Women's Convention and the
Children's Convention. If this is the case, the drafters ought to
have entirely omitted any reference to reservations, recognizing,
in effect, the application of general international law as set forth
in the Vienna Convention. The fact that they did not omit any
reference to reservations suggests that there is no role for the
69. See Text as Adopted by the Working Group at Second Reading
F/CN.4/1989t29/Rev.1, reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD, A GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIREs 549 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992); Article 23
(Reports from States Parties) - Article 44, reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, A GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 551-60 (Sharon
Detrick ed., 1992).
70. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4.
71. See Children's Convention, supra note 3, at preamble. The Convention states that
a child "needs special safeguards and care including appropriate legal protection before as
well as after birth." Id.
72. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 200, 202-03.
73. See id. at 201-02, 204, 207.
74. See id. at 207.
75. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at arts, 19-23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-38.
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states parties in determining whether the reservations are valid.
Another possible inference is that any reservation that is
incompatible with the object and purpose of either of the Conven-
tions is inadmissible, even if there is no opposition from another
state party. The Vienna Convention itself lends support to the
alternative view that reservations are only inadmissible when
states parties object to them. 76
Several states parties have formulated objections to reserva-
tions that they consider unacceptable. The general reservations
to the Women's Convention, which subject the interpretation of
the Convention to either national constitutional law or Islamic
law, have provoked many objections. The general reservation
made by the Republic of Maldives, which specifically subjects the
Convention to the Islamic Shariah,77 has been objected to by
Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal and Sweden.78 Denmark, Finland, Germany, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden also filed objections79 to a
similar reservation formulated by Libya.80 In addition, Austria,
Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and
Sweden8l objected to similar reservations by Kuwait.82 Germany,
Mexico, the Netherlands, and Sweden have objected quite
regularly to reservations to various provisions of the Convention
that they deem unacceptable. One or more of these countries has
challenged the reservations formulated by Bangladesh, Brazil,
Cyprus, Egypt, India, Iraq, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea,
Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, Thailand, Tunisia and
Turkey.8 3
Several of the general reservations to the Children's Conven-
tion have provoked objections, but a limited number of states are
responsible for the objections. One or more of the following
countries - Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Norway, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden - have challenged
reservations made by Indonesia, Qatar, Syria, Iran, Bangladesh,
Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Tunisia, Pakistan, Malaysia and
Myanmar.'4 Unlike the case of the Women's Convention, there
76. See id. at art. 21, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
77. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 172.
78. See id. at 177-79.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 172.
81. See id. at 177-79.
82. See id. at 171.
83. See id. at 177-79.
84. See id. at 208-10.
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have been virtually no objections to instances in which states
have formulated single, specific reservations to distinct provisions
of the Children's Convention.
In the case of both the Women's Convention and the Chil-
dren's Convention, relatively few states parties have formulated
objections to the reservations of other countries. Even of those
that have done so, the practice is inconsistent. For example,
Canada objected to the Republic of Maldives' reservation to the
Women's Convention, but took no action with respect to a
subsequent and comparable reservation by Kuwait.8 5 The same
inconsistency is apparent in the objections to reservations to the
Children's Convention. Moreover, a states practice of objecting
varies from one instrument to the other, as if a general reserva-
tion to the Women's Convention is more serious than one to the
Children's Convention. This practice gives the impression that
most objecting states are making perfunctory objections with no
discernable policy.
The aforementioned perception confirms the observations of
the Human Rights Committee, set forth in its General Comment
Number 24, of an "unclear" pattern of objections that have only
been "occasional[ly], made by some states but not others, and on
grounds not always specified."86 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides that it is by objecting that states
indicate their refusal to accept a reservation. Pursuant to Article
20, Paragraph 5 of the Vienna Convention:
.. [Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is
considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have
raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period
of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by
the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the
treaty, whichever is later.8 7
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 21, Paragraph 3, "[wlhen a
State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into
force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the
provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as
between the two States to the extent of the reservation."88
Echoing the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human
85. See id. at 177.
86. General Comment No. 24, supra note 14, reprinted in 15 Hum. Rts. L.J. 464, 467
(1994).
87. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 20, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
88. Id. at art. 21, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
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Rights, 9 the European Commission of Human Rights,9° and the
European Court of Human Rights,9' the Human Rights Committee
concluded that the objections regime of the Vienna Convention is
"inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human
rights treaties."9 The Committee observed that objections are
useful only to the extent that they "may provide some guidance
to the Committee in its interpretation of compatibility with the
object and purpose" of the treaty.93 . The Committee's position has
met with opposition in the form of observations presented by the
United States,94 the United Kingdom, 95 and France.96
III. ROLE OF THE TREATY BODIES
The classic view regarding the validity of reservations finds
some support in the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties as well as in the observations of the United
89. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty, 1983 INTER-AM. CT. HUM. RTS., 83-86 (Arts.
4(2) & 4(4), American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion No. OC-383 of
September 8); The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American
Convention, 1982 INTER-AM. CT. HUM RTs., 13-25 (Arts. 74 & 75, Advisory Opinion No.
OC-2/82 of September 24).
90. See Temeltasch v. Switzerland (reservations and interpretative declarations), No.
9116/80, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 417, 420-22 (1983) Commission report); Austria v. Italy, 1961
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 116, 141 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). See Pierre-Henri Imbert, Les
Rdserves d la Convention Europdenne des Droits de LTHomme devant la Commission de
Strasbourg (Affaire Temeltasch), 1983 REVUE GOMNALE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
580; William A. Schabas, Article 64, in Convention Europeenne des Droits de L'Homme,
Commentaire Article par Article 923, 939-40 (Louis-Edmond Pettiti et al. eds., 1995).
91. See Belilos v. Switzerland,132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 47 (1988). See also
Frank Horn, supra note 31, at 156-58; Gerard Cohen-Jonathan, Les Rfserves A Is
Convention Europdenne des Droits de L'Homme (A propos de l'arret Belilos du 29 avril
1988), 93 REVUE GNrALE DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 273, 277-78 (1989).
92. General Comment No. 24, supra note 14, at para. 17.
93. Id. See also Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (indicating
preliminary objections).
94. See Observations by the United States of America on General Comment No. 24
(52), 16 HUM. RTS. LJ. 422 (1995) [hereinafter U.S. Observations] (observations
transmitted by letter dated March 28, 1995). See also U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.18, 51
(providing the remarks of the Legal Advisor, Conrad Harper, to the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly).
95. See Report of the Human Rights Committee (Submission of Reports and Additional
Information by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant During the Period of
Review), U.N. GAOR, 50th Seas., Annex III, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995) [hereinafter United
Kingdom Observations] (stating the observations of the United Kingdom of Great Britian
and Nothern Ireland under Article 40, para. 5, of the Covenant), reprinted in 16 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 424 (1995).
96. See Report of the Human Rights Committee (Observations of States Parties under
Article 40), U.N. GAOR, 51st Seas., Annex VI, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (1996) (stating the
observations of France under Article 40, para. 5, of the Covenant) [hereinafter Frances
Observations].
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States and France to the Human Rights Committee's General
Comment Number 24. Those who hold this view proffer that the
determination of whether reservations are permissible falls
exclusively to the states parties who express their views in the
form of objections. 7 The modern view, however, is that the treaty
bodies are competent to address the legality of reservations
during their consideration of the states parties' periodic reports."
Recently, The International Law Commission, which desig-
nated Professor Alain Pellet as rapporteur on the subject of
reservations, considered the question of the validity of reserva-
tions. In his report, submitted to the 1995 session of the
Commission, Professor Pellet wrote:
138. Although it is extremely flexible; the general reserva-
tions regime is largely based on the idea of reciprocity, a
concept difficult to transpose to the field of human rights or
indeed to other fields. As they are intended to apply without
discrimination to all human beings, treaties concluded in this
field do not lend themselves to reservations and objections
and, in particular, the objecting State cannot be released from
its treaty obligations vis-a-vis citizens of the reserving state.
139. Thus, in its General Comment No. 24 (52) of 2
November 1994, the Human Rights Committee considered
that "Human rights treaties...and the [International] Covenant
[on Civil and Political Rights] specifically, are not a web of
inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern
the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of
inter-state reciprocity has no place . . ." and that u... the
operation of the classic rules on reservations is [so] inade-
quate..."
140. More so than other treaties human rights treaties
include monitoring mechanisms and the question is whether
these bodies are competent to assess the validity of reserva-
tions. The European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights have recognized their own
competence in this area because of the "objective obligations"
deriving from the convention of Rome of 1950. Similarly, in
its General Comment No. 24 (52), the Human Rights Commit-
tee considered that '[i]t necessarily falls to the Committee to
97. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7; U.S. Observations, supra note 94; France's
Observations, supra note 96.
98. See General Comment No. 24, supra note 14, at para. 18, reprinted in 15 Hum. RTs.
L.J. at 467.
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determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with
the object and purpose of the covenant in part because
... it is an inappropriate task for States parties in relation
to human rights treaties and in part because it is a task that
the Committee cannot avoid in the performance of its
functions.99
The treaty bodies set up under the human rights treaties of
the United Nations system, including the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, are entrusted with the examination of initial
and periodic reports from states parties.'0° Within this sphere,
the committees have been increasingly willing to raise the issue
of reservations with states parties. In 1992, the chairpersons of
the treaty bodies agreed that:
[Treaty bodies should systematically review reservations
made when considering a report and include in the list of
questions to be addressed to reporting Governments a
question as to whether a given reservation was still necessary
and whether a State party would consider withdrawing a
reservation that might be considered by the treaty body
concerned as being incompatible with the object and purpose
of the treaty.'0'
By 1994, the chairpersons had become considerably less equivocal,
recommending "that treaty bodies state clearly that certain
reservations to international human rights instruments are
contrary to the object and purpose of those instruments and
consequently incompatible with treaty law."10 2
Although General Comment No. 24 is applicable only to the
Human Rights Committee, its discussion of the issue is relevant
99. First Report on the Law and Practice Relating to Reservations to Treaties: Allain
Pellet, U.N. GAOR, Int'l Law Comm., 47th Seas., at 64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/470 (1995). See
also the remarks by Professor Pellet cited in the 1996 report of the International Law
Commission on role of treaty bodies in judging the legality of reservations. See Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR,
Int'l Law Comm., 48th Seas., at paras. 128-32, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
100. See AGNES DORMENVAL, PROCtDURES ONUSIENNES DE MISE EN OEUVRE DES DRorrs
DE LHOMME: LIMITES OU DSFAUTs (1991).
101. Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including
Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, Note by the
Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Seas., Agenda Item 97, at para. 36, U.N. Doc.
A/47/628 (1992).
102. Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including
Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, Note by the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 49th Seas., Agenda Item 100, at para. 30, U.N. Doc.
A/49/537 (1994).
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to the work and the mandate of the other committees. The
Human Rights Committee stated that "[i]t necessarily falls to the
Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is compat-
ible with the object and purpose of the Covenant."10 3 For the
Committee, "[b]ecause of the special character of a human rights
treaty, the compatibility of a reservation with the object and
* purpose of the Covenant must be established objectively, by refer-
ence to legal principles, and the Committee is particularly well
placed to perform this task."1°4 In its observations on General
Comment No. 24, the United Kingdom admitted that "the Com-
mittee must necessarily be able to take a view of the status and
effect of a reservation where this is required in order to permit
the Committee to carry out its substantive functions ...."105
The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action stated that
"the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women should continue its review of reservations to the Conven-
tion."106 During its thirteenth session, in 1994, the Committee for
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women examined the
matter of reservations. Noting that it had addressed the issue on
several occasions in the past, and citing the Declaration of the
Vienna Conference, the Committee decided 'to bring again to the
attention of the States parties the seriousness with which the
Committee considers the problem of reservations and request[]
that this concern be conveyed to the seventh meeting of States
parties."1°7 Furthermore, the Committee decided to amend its
guidelines for the preparation of periodic reports. It required
states parties that had entered substantive reservations to the
Convention to provide information on the reservations in each of
their periodic reports.
In reporting on reservations, the State party should indicate
why it considered the reservation to be necessary and whether
reservations the State party may or may not have entered on
obligations with regard to the same rights in other conventions
are consistent with the reservations to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, as
103. General Comment No. 24, supra note 14, at para. 18 (relating to reservations to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
104. Id.
105. United Kingdom Observations, supra note 95, at Annex III, reprinted in 16 HuM.
RTS. L.J. at 425.
106. Vienna Declaration, supra note 17, at para. 39, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. LJ. at
359, para. 11.
107. 1994 CEDAW Report, supra note 41, at 13.
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well as the precise effect of the reservation in terms of national
law and policy. It should indicate the plans that it has to limit
the effect of reservations and ultimately withdraw them and,
whenever possible, specify a timetable for withdrawing them.
States parties which have entered general reservations that do
not refer to a specific article of the Convention or reservations to
Articles 2 and 3 should make a particular effort to report on the
effect and interpretation of them. The Committee considers these
to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the present
Convention.101
The Committee also requested that a special letter be sent by
the Secretary-General to those states that had formulated
substantive reservations, drawing their attention to the Commit-
tee's concern. 9 The Committee recommended that the Center for
Human Rights and the Division for the Advancement of Women,
via their programmes of advisory services, provide states parties
with advice on the withdrawal of their reservations." 0  In
addition, the Committee determined that it would include a
section in which it expresses its views on the reservations as part
of its concluding observations on the periodic reports of States
parties that had entered substantive reservations to the Conven-
tion."' Finally, on the subject of objections, the Committee
encouraged objecting States "to enter into a dialogue on a
bilateral basis with the States to whose reservations they object
with a view to finding a solution."1' 2 At its 1996 meeting, the
Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare a report, in order
"to facilitate a discussion on reservations to the Convention."" 3
The report was to include a review of the discussions of United
Nations Conferences and women's human rights non-govern-
mental organizations on the subject." 4 It was to be a qualitative
comparison of reservations to different treaties and an analysis of
reservations "that are contrary to the object and purpose of the
108. Id. The Committee later completed these comments with new guidelines for the
preparation of periodic reports that describe the appropriate information on reservations.
See Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at para. 652, U.N. Doc. A/50/38 (1995) (hereinafter 1995
CEDAW Report].
109. See 1994 CEDAW Report, supra note 41, at 13.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 13-14.
112. See id. at 14.
113. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 38, at para. 346, U.N. Doc. A5!/38 (1996) [hereinafter
1996 CEDAW Report].
114. See id.
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Convention or which are otherwise incompatible with interna-
tional treaty law.""' 5
In 1994, the Committee on the Rights of the Child adopted
a recommendation in which it stressed the importance of a
"holistic approach" to the Convention and reservations thereto."16
The Committee noted that some of the reservations and declara-
tions actually strengthened the norms of the convention, such as
those dealing with the minimum age for military service. On the
other hand, it also observed that some of the reservations were
based on a rather restrictive view of the provisions of the
Convention.11 7 In addition, it determined that the question of
reservations should be considered in the course of the dialog
undertaken with states parties during presentation of their
periodic reports."8
Both the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child
are charged with examining the periodic reports of States parties.
To do this they must establish the obligations that those States
parties have assumed. For example, pursuant to the Women's
Convention, the Committee must consider the legislative, judicial,
administrative or other measures adopted by states parties "to
give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and on the
progress made in this respect"1 9 Under the Children's Conven-
tion, periodic reports by states parties "shall also contain suffi-
cient information to provide the Committee with a comprehensive
understanding of the implementation of the Convention in the
country concemed."120 It would seem impossible for the Commit-
tees to carry out these responsibilities without considering the
issue of reservations.
During the presentations of periodic reports, members of the
Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
have often questioned states parties about their reservations to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
115. Id.
116. Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 41, at para. 528, U.N. Doc. A/49/41 (1994)
117. See id. at para. 527.
118. Id. at para. 529-34.
119. Women's Convention, supra note 5, at art. 18.
120. Children's Convention, supra note 3, at art. 44.
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Against Women. 121 At its 1996 session, for example, the Commit-
tee "noted" as a "principal subject of concern" that Cuba did not
intend to withdraw its reservation to Article 29, Paragraph 2.122
Also at its 1996 session, during consideration of the report of the
Committee "noted with concern the reservation of the Government
as to the exclusion of women from the military."123 Australia's
reservation concerning paid maternity leave has been criticized by
the Committee, which has urged that it be withdrawn. 124
Australia has told the Committee that as a result of revised
employment policies, it would "adjust" its reservation. 125 Belgium
informed the Committee of its intention to withdraw reservations
to Articles 7 and 15 of the Convention, given the adoption of new
legislation enabling women to exercise royal powers and changes
in the Constitution rendering void the reservation relating to
marriage law. Belgium also said that its reservations to all
human rights treaties were being revised, in keeping with the
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.126 The Committee
commended Belgium for this undertaking.127 Several experts had
done the same the previous year when Mauritius announced that
it was withdrawing its reservations to Articles 11.(b), 11.1(d) and
16.1(g) of the Convention. 12s The Committee made no comment,
however, on the fact that Mauritius was not withdrawing its
reservation to Article 29, Paragraph 2 of the Convention.
The presentation of Tunisia's combined initial and second
reports, in January 1995, provoked considerable reaction from
members of the Committee. Among its many reservations,
121. See Report of the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Seas., Supp. No. 45, at para. 190, Vol. II, U.N. Doc. A/39/45 (1985)
(discussing the initial report of Egypt); Report of the Committee for the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 44th Seas., Supp. No. 38, at para. 74, U.N.
Doc. A/44/38 (1990) (discussing the initial report of Ireland); Report of the Committee for
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sees., Supp. No. 38,
at para. 273, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1990) (discussing the initial report of Belgium).
122. 1996 CEDAW Report, supra note 113, at para. 214.
123. Id. at para. 43. This comment is puzzling, because the only reservation formulated
by Cyprus concerns nationality. 'The Government of the Republic of Cyprus wishes to enter
a reservation concerning the granting to women of equal rights with men with respect to
the nationality of their children, mentioned in Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Convention.
This reservation is to be withdrawn upon amendment of the relevant law." Multilateral
Treaties, supra note 4, at 169.
124. See 1995 CEDAW Report, supra note 108, at para. 596.
125. See 1994 CEDAW Report, supra note 41, at para. 379. See also id., at para. 390.
126. See 1996 CEDAW Report, supra note 113, at para. 166.
127. See id. at para. 174.
128. See 1995 CEDAW Report, supra note 108, at paras. 163, 187-88. Mauritius'
reservations to Articles 11 and 16 had provoked objections from Germany, Mexico, the
Netherlands and Sweden. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 172.
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Tunisia had made a general declaration stating that it would not
take "any organizational or legislative decision in conformity with
the requirements of this Convention where such a decision would
conflict with the provisions of Chapter I of the Tunisian Constitu-
tion."129 Members of the Committee expressed concern about the
declaration, as well as specific reservations or declarations aimed
at Articles 9, 15 and 16.130 The Tunisian representative replied
that the Convention "had been ratified in a particular
socio-political context, which was marked by rising fundamental-
ism, conservative traditions and related issues."' Moreover,
"[tihe general declaration, however, did in no way intend to
detract from the Government's commitment to the Convention.
It was only made to explain the reservations entered.""3 2
In 1994, when Libya presented its initial report, members of
the Committee expressed "[g]eneral and serious concern about the
reservation that had been entered at the time of accession and
about the fact that the reservation was not at all touched upon
in the report."13 The Committee declared that it went counter to
the object and purpose of the Convention. 13 Libya was also
asked whether it had considered the objections made by many
other states to the reservations. 13 Members of the Committee
reminded Libya of its claim that the Shariah gives women
equality and asked if this was the case why the reservation was
necessary.'3 The members of the Committee observed that:
129. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 174.
130. See 1995 CEDAW Report, supra note 108, at paras. 222 and 266.
131. Id. at para. 222.
132. See id.
133. 1994 CEDAW Report supra note 41, at para. 130. The reservation, produced at
the time of accession on May 15, 1989, states: "1. Article 2 of the Convention shall be
implemented with due regard for the peremptory norms of the Islamic Shariah relating to
determination of the inheritance portions of the estate of a deceased person, whether
female or male. 2. The implementation of paragraph 16 (c) and (d) of the Convention shall
be without prejudice to any of the rights guaranteed to women by the Islamic Shariah."
Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 172. On 5 July 1995, Libya filed what it called the
'new formulation of its reservation to the Convention, which replaces the formulation
contained in the instrument of accession." Id. at 182, n. 21. The new declaration states:
[Accession] is subject to the general reservation that such accession cannot conflict with
the laws on personal status derived from the Islamic Shariah." Id. Note that the Vienna
Convention, supra note 7, art art. 19, states that reservations must be made at the time
of accession.
134. See 1994 CEDAW Report, supra note 41, at para. 179.
135. See id. Objections were produced by Denmark, Finland, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 177-78. In 1996 Finland
filed a second objection in response to the amended reservation. See
<hhp;//ww/.un.org/DeptTreaty/>, supra note 4.
136. See 1994 CEDAW Report, supra note 41, at para. 130.
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... the reservation was very much related to the question of
interpretation of the Shariah. They felt that the Shariah was
very supportive of women's equality, rights and dignity.
However, it had come into force 1,500 years ago and was not
immutable. The Shariah itself gave equality to women, but
the problem that had to be overcome was that of interpreta-
tion. Religions should evolve over time, but the evolution or
the ijtihad, the interpretation of the Shariah, had come to a
standstill three centuries ago. The thinking about some
religious roles had not evolved from that time and it was not
proper to apply a standard that had applied several centuries
ago to the present world. In some countries the Shariah had
been interpreted in a more progressive way, as a result of the
political will of the Government. The Koran permitted the
ijtihad for the interpretation of the Islamic religion. There-
fore, efforts should be made to proceed to an interpretation of
the Shariah that was permissible and did not block the
advancement of women. The Government was urged to take
a leading role in its interpretation of the Shariah as a model
for other Islamic countries. Reservations that were incompat-
ible with the goals of the Convention were not acceptable. 13 7
The Libyan representative replied that such reservations had
been entered by Islamic countries "in order to avoid embarrass-
ment in view of the literal meaning of legal texts."13
The Committee on the Rights of the Child initially was
hesitant in its treatment of reservations. For example, in
presenting its initial report, Egypt stated that "The Egyptian
Government recorded its reservation regarding the right to
adoption when it ratified the Convention. Adoption is illegal in
Islamic Shariah."139 Following examination of the Egyptian report
in 1992, the Committee made no comment whatsoever on this
point in its observations. 14° However, during consideration of the
137. Id. at para. 132.
138. Id. at para. 131. See also id, at para. 174 (Libya claimed that, as women received
their inheritance without commitments, the provision of the Shariah that directed female
children to receive half of what male children would receive was not discriminatory against
women).
139. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Egypt),
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, at 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3Add.6 (1992).
140. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Egypt,
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.5 (1992); see also
Provisional Agenda and Annotations, Note by the Secretary-General, Comm. on the Rts.
of the Child, 1st Sees., U.N. Doc. CIC/CV (1991).
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report, member Yuri Kolosov said he was aware that the Shariah
was the fundamental source of legislation governing the Arab
States, but noted that Egypt had made no specific reference to
differences between the sexes in its reservation to the Convention,
that it must now strictly uphold.14' In effect, Kolosov appears to
have been condemning the Egyptian reservation as being vague
and to have been suggesting that the consequence of such
vagueness was the convention's full application.
By 1994, the Committee on the Rights of the Child showed
signs of increasing boldness in challenging reservations to the
Convention. Its new attitude was soon demonstrated when it
considered Pakistan's initial report. Pakistan had formulated an
"Islamic reservation"' 42 that drew objections from several States
parties. 143 Committee members were harsh in their criticism 14
They stated bluntly that the reservation was contrary to the
purpose of the Convention and thus inadmissible.' 4  The
representative of Pakistan agreed to forward the Committee's
views to his government, "if they represented the unanimous
views of the Committee,"146 something of which he was promptly
reassured.147  The Committee concluded that the reservation
raised "deep concern as to its compatibility with the object and
purpose of the Convention."14
Morocco's reservation to Article 14, which grants children
freedom of religion, explains that "the religion of the State is
Islam."149 Thomas Hammarberg asked Morocco why it had made
the reservation given that other Islamic countries in the same
region had seen no need to do so.'5° Morocco's representative
141. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the
Convention, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 3d Sees., 66th mtg., at para. 40, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SR.66 (1992).
142. Stating that the "[provisions of the Convention shall be interpreted in the light of
the principles of Islamic laws and values." Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 206.
143. See id. at pp. 208-10 (Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and
Sweden).
144. See Summary Record of the 132nd meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th
Sess., at paras. 8, 9, and 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/CSlR132 (1994) (discussing Pakistan).
145. See id. at paras. 12, 13.
146. Id. at para. 15.
147. See id. at para. 16.
148. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Pakistan), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th Sess., at para. 9, U.N. Doc.
CRQC/15/Add.18 (1994).
149. Summary Record of the 317th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 30th Sess.,
317th mtg., at para. 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.317 (1996) (discussing Morocco).
150. See id. at para. 41. See also id. at paras. 40, 47, 51, 54, and 60.
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explained that Moroccan laws were based on religious law, and
that there was no possibility that a person born a Muslim might
change religion because this would be contrary to the principles
of basic Muslim law. 15 1  In its conclusions, the Committee
included an increasingly more common response there might be
"questions about the compatibility of the reservation with the
object and purpose of the Convention." 152
The Committee challenged Tunisia's reservations, particularly
to Article 2. Tunisia replied that it had preferred an approach
of honesty and coherence. 1' 4 Yuri Kolosov explained that the
Committee had set an "ambitious goal" of eliminating all reserva-
tions and declarations, and suggested that Tunisia might be the
first state to undertake the process.155 The Committee concluded
that Tunisia's reservation raised concern about its compatibility
with the object and purpose of the Convention.15 The Committee
confronted religious arguments from another religious perspective
when it challenged the reservations made by the Holy See. Like
its Islamic counterparts, the Holy See invoked religious impera-
tives and said that its reservations were necessary because of the
teachings of the Catholic church. 157
In late 1994, when the United Kingdom presented its report
on Hong Kong, the delegation informed the Committee that after
a review it had decided to maintain its declarations and reserva-
tions to the Convention.118 During the discussion, Thomas
Hammarberg asked whether the issue of reservations had been
discussed with the Chinese. 159 The delegation told the Committee
151. See id. at para. 57.
152. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Morocco), Comm. On the Rts. of the Child, 13th Seas., at para. 7, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.60 (1996).
153. Summary Record of the 226th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th Seas.,
at paras. 8, 21, 30 and 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/CVSR.226 (1995) (discussing Tunisia).
154. See id. at para. 29.
155. Summary Record of the 227th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th Seas.,
227th mtg., at para. 42, U.N. Doc. CRC/SR.227 (1995) (discussing Tunisia).
156. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Tunisia), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th Seas., at para. 6, U.N. Doc. CRC/C,15/Add.39
(1995).
157. See Summary Record of the 225th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 10th
seas., 255th mtg., at para. 37, U.N. Doc. CRC/CSR.255 (1995) (discussing Holy See).
158. See Summary Record of the 329th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 13th
Seas., at para. 5, U.N. Doc. CRC/CSR.329 (1996) (discussing the United Kingdom).
159. See id. at para. 28.
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that this was indeed the case.l1° Interestingly, China itself had
only formulated one reservation to the Convention in contrast
with the four reservations the United Kingdom formulated for
Hong Kong.161 The Committee made no comment on the admissi-
bility of the reservations, but said that it was "a matter of regret"
that the reservations were not being withdrawn. 162
The Committee has expressed concern about "the broad
nature of the reservations" made by New Zealand, which it said
raises questions as to their compatibility with the object and
purpose of the Convention. 16 The Committee contested Jordan's
reservations to Articles 14, 20 and 21, stating that the reserva-
tions "may raise questions about the compatibility of the reserva-
tions with the object and purpose of the Convention."16 Occasion-
ally, using an original terminology, the Committee has suggested
that reservations may be incompatible "with the principles and
provisions of the Convention. "16
Frequently, the Committee demands that States parties
withdraw their reservations, "in the spirit on the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights," even when it does not suggest that the
reservations actually violate the object and purpose of the Con-
160. See id. at para. 76.
161. See Summary Record of the 331st meeting, Comm. on the Rts. Of the Child, 13th
'ess., 331st mtg., at para. 56, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.331 (1996) (discussing the United
Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland); Report on the Twelfth Session, at para.
128, U.N. Doc. CRC/C54 (1996).
162. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United
Kingdom), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 30th Seas., 331st mtg., at para. 10, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.63 (1996).
163. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: New
Zealand), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 14th Seas., at para. 8, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.71 (1997).
164. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Jordan),
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th Sess., at para. 9, U.N. Doc. CRC/CY15/Add.21 (1994).
Objections to these reservations have been made by Finland, Ireland and Sweden. See
Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 177-79.
165. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Republic of Korea), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 11th Sess., at para. 8, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.51 (1996); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under
Article 44 of the Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of
the Child: Slovenia), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 13th Seas., at para 10, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.65 (1996).
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vention.16 The discussions go well beyond the perfunctory and on
several occasions members of the Committee have debated at
length about the scope of the reservations and the possibility that
they be withdrawn with representatives of the States parties. In
the case of Argentina, reservations were made to several para-
graphs of Article 21, because "before they can be applied, a strict
mechanism must exist for the legal protection of children in
matters of inter-country adoption, in order to prevent trafficking
in and the sale of children."167 Argentina argued before the
Committee that the provisions reinforced the principle of the
child's best interests and therefore extended, rather than limited,
the scope of the Convention.'16 One of the Committee members,
Marta Santos Pais, urged Argentina to withdraw the reservation
and simply interpret Article 21 in a way that would give effect to
its concerns.'6 Thomas Hammarberg also took Argentina to task
for its somewhat enigmatic declaration relating to Article 24.170
After hearing the reply of Argentina's representative, however,' 7 '
he said it seemed to him that the policy of the Argentina
government was precisely the policy that the Convention hoped
to promulgate. 72 The Committee concluded by encouraging
Argentina to review its reservation to Article 21 with a view to
withdrawing it. 173
The Committee also sharply critized Canada for its reserva-
tions to Article 21, in which Canada invoked concerns for
aboriginal children by stating that customary forms of care might
conflict with the provision. 74 The Canadian representative said
166. Summary Record of the 177th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 7th Seas.,
at para. 4, U.N. Doc. CRC/CI/SR177 (1994) (inviting the Argentina delegation to respond
to questions regarding the implementation of the Convention).
167. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4 at 200.
168. See, e.g., Summary Record of the 177th Meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child,
7th Seas., 177th mtg., at paras. 8, 29-31, and 53-55, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.177 (1994)
(discussing Argentina).
169. See id. at para. 15. See also id. at paras. 44, 47 (remarks of Thomas Hammarberg)
and para. 48
(remarks of Yuri Kolosov).
170. See Summary Record of the 179th meeting, Comm. of the Rts. of the Child, 7th
Seas., 179th mtg., at para. 3, U.N. Doc. CRC_/CSR.179 (1994) (discussing Argentina).
171. See id. at para. 9.
172. See id. at para. 15.
173. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Argentina), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 8th Seas., at para. 14, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.35 (1994).
174. See Summary Record of the 214th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th
Sess., 214th mtg., paras. 26, 30-31 and 58, U.N. Doc. CRC/CSR.214 (1995) (discussing
Canada). See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 201.
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that the perceived need for a reservation had arisen during the
ratification process after consultations with indigenous communi-
ties. 17 5 Thomas Hammarberg explained that in his view, a.
reservation was not necessary, and that Canada might easily
have produced a declaration explaining how it intended to
implement the Convention. 76 Canada explained that while it
would look further into the issue, it would make no undertaking
to modify the reservations. 177  The Committee also challenged
Canada for its reservation to Article 37(c), concerning the
separation of juvenile and adult offenders. 17s  The Committee
concluded that Canada should consider withdrawing its reserva-
tions and added that Canada should keep the Committee
"informed of developments on this fundamental matter.' 1 79
France's reservation to Article 30 of the Convention, dealing
with ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, echoed a similar
declaration it produced with respect to Article 27 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'8 0 Marta Santos
Pais urged France to reconsider its reservation to article 30. s18
Yuri Kolosov questioned the French delegation as to whether the
statement really was a reservation or a declaration. 8 2 Indeed,
France's periodic report spoke of a reservation, whereas the
official records of the United Nations refer to the statement as a
declaration. 8 3 The French representative answered that France
had indeed made a reservation to Article 30. He explained that
under French law, the notion of "minority had always been
viewed as running contrary to principles of non-discrimination."'' 4
He added, however, that despite legal differences in approach to
175. See Summary Record of the 214th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th
Seas., 214th mtg., at paras. 59-60, U.N. Doc. CRQ/CVSr.214 (1995).
176. See id. at para. 62.
177. See id. at para. 64.
178. See id. at paras. 12, 32 and 58. For Canada's replies, see id. at paras. 65-66;
Summary Record of the 215th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th Seas., 215th
mtg., at paras. 37, 46, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.215 (1995) (discussing Canada);
179. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Canada), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 9th Seas., at para 18, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.37 (1995).
180. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Declarations and
Reservations: France (last modified May 12, 1997) <http;/www.un.org/DeptW4Treaty>.
181. See Summary Record of the 139th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th
sess., 139th mtg., at para. 25, U.N. Doc. CRC/CISR.139 (1994) (discussing France).
182. See id. at paras. 24, 26. See also id. at para. 29. Kolosov later opined that the
statement was only a declaration. Id. at para. 33.
183. See id. at para. 27.
184. Id. at para. 30.
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the problem, France accorded the same guarantees to indivi-
duals. 85
Croatia, 88 Norway, 8 7 and Mauritius 188 have informed the
Committee that they are considering withdrawal of their reserva-
tions. Others, such as Denmark, 8 9 Indonesia,19° Pakistan,191 the
Republic of Korea,' 92 and Slovenia 93 have stated that they are
185. See Summary Record of the 139th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th
sess., 139th mtg., at para 30, U.N. Doc. CRC/CVSR139 (1994) (discussing France). See also
id. at para. 35.
186. See Summary Record of the 281st meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 11th
sess., 281st mtg., at para. 68, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.281 (1996) (discussing Croatia);
Summary Record of the 279th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 11th Sess., 279th
meeting, at para. 14, U.N. Doc. CRCQCSR279 (1996); Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties under article 44 of the Convention (Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Croatia), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 11th
Sess., para. 3, U.N. Doc. CRQC/15/Add.52 (1996).
187. See Summary Record of the 149th meeting, 6th Sess., 149th mtg., at para. 7, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/SR.149 (1994) (discussing Norway); Summary Record of the 151st meeting,
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th Sess., 151st mtg., at para. 41, U.N. Doc.
CRC/QSR.151 (1994) (discussing Norway); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties under Article 44 of the Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child: Norway), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th Sess., at paras. 5
and 13, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.23 (1994).
188. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Mauritius), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 13th Sess., at para. 3, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.64 (1996).
189. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Concluding Observations of the Committee: Denmark), Comm. On the Rts. Of
the Child, 8th Sess., at para. 24, U.N. Doc. CRQC/15/Add.33 (1995).
190. See Summary Record of the 79th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 4th
Sess., at paras. 30, 36 and 52, U.N. Doc. CRC/CSR.79 (1994Xdiscussing Indonesia);
Summary Record of the 80th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 4th Sess., 80th
mtg., at para. 54, U.N. Doc. CRCQC/SR.80 (1993); Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention (Preliminary Observations of the
Committee: Indonesia), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 4th Sess., at para 4, U.N. Doc.
CRC/CV15/Add.7 (1993).
191. See Summary Record of the 132nd meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th
Sess., at paras. 9, 11, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR132 (1994) (discussing Pakistan).
192. See Summary Record of the 276th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 11th
Seas., 276th mtg., at paras. 8, 14, U.N. Doc. CRQ(C'SR.276 (1996) (discussing the Republic
of Korea); Summary Record of the 277th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 11th
sess., 277th mtg., at para. 60, U.N. Doc. CRC/CSR.277 (1996); Summary Record of the
278th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 11th Sess., 278th mtg., at para. 40, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/SR.278 (1996) (Republic of Korea); Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention (Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Republic of Korea), Comm. on the Rts. of the Child,
11th Sess., at para. 6, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.51 (1996).
193. See Summary Record of the 337th meeting, Comm. On the Rts. of the Child, 13th
sess., 337th mtg., at para. 8, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.337 (1996) (discussing Slovenia);
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention
(Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Slovenia), Comm.
on the Rts. of the Child, 13th Sess., at para. 20, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.65 (1996).
106 WmLLAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 3:79
reconsidering them. The Committee has congratulated Myanmar
for the withdrawal of its reservations to Articles 15 and 37 of the
Convention."'
In at least a few cases, the persistence of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child on the subject of reservations has borne
fruit. During presentation of its initial report in 1994, Indonesia's
numerous reservations, invoking the national Constitution to limit
obligations under the Convention, were aggressively questioned
by members of the Committee. 195 The Indonesian representative
promised that they "might be reviewed and withdrawn at a later
stage."'9 However, even if the questioning seemed somewhat
equivocal, the Committee's conclusions were harsh: 'the broad and
imprecise nature of these reservations raises serious concern as
to their compatibility with the object and purposes of the
Convention."197 A year later, in a follow-up presentation to the
Committee, the Indonesian representative explained that the
reservations had been misunderstood, and that they were really
only intended to be interpretative declarations. 198  Thomas
Hammarberg suggested that Indonesia send a new letter to the
Secretary-General clarifying its position, and stating that there
were in fact no reservations to the Convention.199 No such
declaration, however, has been produced.
Individuals may also attack reservations in the context of
litigation in which they invoke the rights that are enshrined in
the various international human rights instruments. This
litigation may take place before international tribunals such as
194. See Summary Record of the 79th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 4th
Sess., 79th mtg., at paras. 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 43, 45, 47, 49 and 53, U.N. Doc.
CRC/CVSR79 (1994) (discussing Indonesia). Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden
have objected to the Indonesian reservations. See, Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at
208-10.
195. See Summary Record of the 79th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 4th
Sess., 79th mtg., at paras. 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 43, 45, 47, 49 and 53, U.N. Doc.
CRQCCSR79 (1994) (discussing Indonesia). Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden
have objected to the Indonesian reservations. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at
208-10.
196. Summary Record of the 79th meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 4th Sess.,
79th mtg., at para. 29, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR79 (1994) (discussing Indonesia).
197. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention (Preiminazy Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Indonesia), Comm. on the Rts. of. the Child, 4th Sess., at para. 7, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C15/Add.7 (1993).
198. See Summary Record of the 161st meeting, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 7th
Sess., 161st mtg., at para. 2, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.161(1995) (discussing Indonesia).
199. See id. at para. 9.
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the European Court of Human Rights. Although the Human
Rights Committee has implied that it may also be possible to
attack reservations in the course of individual communications
filed under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,2°1 there have yet to be any such
cases. As no comparable individual communication procedure
exists in the case of the Women's Convention and the Children's
Convention, the question does not arise. Discussions, however,
are currently underway with a view to create such mechanisms.
Individuals have also challenged reservations before domestic
courts in states where international conventions have direct
application. In Switzerland, the Second Civil Court of the
Federal Tribunal declared as inoperative a reservation by
Switzerland to the European Convention of Human Rights, 2
despite the fact that no state party had formulated an objection."
The position of the Swiss court is consistent with the object and
purpose of international human rights treaties, which is to protect
individuals. If a state makes reservations that are illegal, then
individuals should be entitled to contest the validity of such
reservations when they are before appropriate tribunals. The
approach of the Swiss court shows that the legality of reserva-
tions is not a matter to be left to the States parties as is
suggested by the ill-suited objections regime proposed by custom-
ary law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL RESERVATIONS
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
"[w]hen a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the
entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving
State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply
as between the two States to the extent of the reservation."2°4
Although not strictly necessary in light of this provision, States
200. See Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Weber v. Switzerland,
177 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. AX1990); Chorherr v. Austria, 266-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993);
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (indicating preliminary objections).
201. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
202. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
203. See Jean-Frangois Flauss, Le Contentieux de Ia ValiditM des Reserves i la CEDH
devant le Tribunal Fddral Suisse: Requiem pour Is D&laration Interprdtative Relative i
L'Article 61, in 5 REvUE UNWERSELLE DES DRos DE L'HoMm 297, 302-03 (1993).
204. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at 337.
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parties objecting to reservations to the Women's Convention and
the Children's Convention have indicated that they consider the
treaty to be in force as between them and the reserving state. 5
More infrequently, states have indicated that, as required by the
Vienna Convention, the objection prevents the Convention from
entering into force between them and the reserving state.2°6
This interpretation is not a satisfactory solution to the
problem of the consequences of invalid reservations. If the
question is viewed as an objective that affects all state parties
and that is susceptible to determination by the treaty bodies in
the examination of periodic reports, by individual communications
where such procedures exist, or by international and domestic
tribunals, then it is essential to determine the effect of invalid
reservations even in the absence of objections. The prevailing
view, supported by judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights, is that a determination must be made as to whether the
reservation is "severable."2  If the reservation is severable, then
the provisions of the treaty will be in force, including the
provisions to which invalid reservations have been made.2" If it
is not, then the reservation compromises the ratification of the
treaty as a whole and it should be deemed not in effect. °
In order to establish whether a reservation is severable, the
intent of the reserving state must be established.210  Where a
state's reservation was a sine qua non of ratification, and where
it would never have consented to be bound by the treaty without
the reservation, then the reservation cannot be severed.21 1 In
many cases, however, various indications of the state's intent,
including statements it has made and the travaux prdparatires
of the ratification process, will indicate that it intends to be
bound by the treaty even if a court deems its reservation to be
invalid.212 This was the conclusion reached by the European
Court of Human Rights in cases involving Switzerland and
205. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 177-80, 208-21.
206. See id.
207. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1995) (indicating preliminary
objections).
208. See Bowett, supra note 31, at 69.
209. See id.
210. See Switzerland v. United States (Interhandel), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 117, (March 21);
France v. Norway (Norwegian Loans), 1957 I.C4. 9, 43-66 (July 6) (Lauterpacht, J.,
dissenting).
211. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 44, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337; France v.
Norway, 1957 I.C.J. 9, at 59.
212. See Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
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Turkey.213 Switzerland had declared that even if the court
declared its reservations invalid, it intended to remain bound by
the European Convention on Human Rights, including the
provision in contention.214 Turkey took the opposite view, but the
court invoked various manifestations of the state's practice to
conclude that the impugned reservation was severable, and that
Turkey was still bound.215
"In principle, the will which ought to prevail is the will to
accept the treaty," wrote D.W. Bowett.216 Professor Bowett noted
a "patent contradiction" in the will of a state that would ratify a
treaty while attaching an illegal condition to it. 2 17 Bowett further
noted that determining a state's intent is "a question of construc-
tion. 218 The Human Rights Committee has taken the same view
and has provided that "[tihe normal consequence of an
unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in
effect at all for a reserving party."219 The Committee has also
stated that "such a reservation will generally be severable, in the
sense that the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party
without benefit of reservation."M' The United States, France, and
the United Kingdom, have reacted vigorously to the Human
Rights Committee on this point in their observations. The United
States has stated, "[s]ince this conclusion is so completely at odds
with established legal practice and principles and even the
express and clear terms of adherence by many States, it would be
welcome if some helpful clarification could be made."221 The
United States also stated that its reservations are "integral parts
of its consent to be bound by the Covenant and are not sever-
able."222 It has further indicated that "[i]f it were to be deter-
mined that any one or more of them were ineffective, the
213. See id.; See also Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (indicating
preliminary objections).
214. See Verbatim record of the public hearings held on 26 October 1987, C. of E. Doc.
No. 87 at 237, 45.
215. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (indicating preliminary
objections).
216. Bowett, supra note 31, at 76.
217. Id. at 75.
218. Id. at 77.
219. General Comment No. 24, supra note 14, at para. 18, reprinted in 15 Hum RTs.
L.J. at 467 (relating to reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
220. Id.
221. U.S. Observations, supra note 94, at 423. See also U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.13, at
52 (1995) (stating the comments of the Legal Advisor, Conrad Harper, to the Sixth
Committee).
222. U.S. Observations, supra note 94, at 423.
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ratification as a whole could thereby be nullified."223 The United
States argues that "[tihe general view of the academic literature"
is that reservations are an essential part of a State's consent, and
"cannot simply be erased."224 It has stated that "[a] state which
expressly withholds its consent from a provision cannot be
presumed, on the basis of some legal fiction, to be bound by it." 5
As has previously been indicated, this position is at odds with the
evolving case law of such bodies as the European Court of Human
Rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child are among the most recent of the universal interna-
tional human rights instruments. Some years ago, their very
existence was a subject of considerable controversy, but they have
quickly become among the most widely ratified. This popularity,
however, has had a price: many of the ratifications have been
accompanied by reservations that significantly reduce and in some
cases effectively eliminate any obligations being assumed by the
ratifying state. Participants at the Vienna Conference on Human
Rights singled out for special attention the exceptional problem
of reservations in the case of these two treaties.2
In terms of geographic distribution, the reservations come
more or less equally from developed and developing countries. In
many cases, these reservations are quite precise and limited, and
leave most of the instrument intact. Although some may argue
that most if not all reservations to substantive provisions of these
treaties are incompatible with their object and purpose, the fact
that reservations are specifically allowed in provisions of the
instruments indicates that their drafters did not by any means
seek to exclude the possibility of reservations. Indeed, their
intent was to allow such minor reservations specifically in order
to encourage widespread ratification, and this goal has been
accomplished. The question remains whether the great and rapid
success of these Conventions, in terms of the number of States
223. Id.
224. Id. at 424.
225. Id.
226. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 17, at paras. 39,46, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS.
L.J. at 359, 360.
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parties, would have been the same were the possibility of
reservation treated more pejoratively.
Nevertheless, both treaties are hampered by the phenomenon
of general reservations, which usually take the form of a refer-
ence to the reserving state's constitutional law or to dicta of the
Shariah. The offenders on this count are Brunei Darussalem, the
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait,
Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, the Republic of Maldives, Pakistan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, and Tunisia.2 The
question may well be asked as to whether the offensive reserva-
tions are merely part of a more general strategy aimed at
weakening and undermining the spread of universal human rights
norms. On the specific subject of reservations, these states have
found a rather curious ally in the United States of America
which, while it has not yet ratified either the Women's or the
Children's Convention, favors the same subversive approach to
international human rights treaties. The United States has
formulated similar reservations to the four treaties it has
accepted: the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide,m the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,229 the International Convention for the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,m and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.? 1
Bolstered by declarations, such as those of the Vienna
Conference, the international courts, commissions, and treaty
bodies have been increasingly vigilant on the subject of reserva-
tions. Both the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child
227. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at 168-75.
228. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 8 (the Convention was first proposed when President Truman was in office). See also
Nicholas F. Kouris & Joseph M. Titlebaum, International Convention on the Prevention
and Ptmishment of the Crime of Genocide: United States Senate Grant of Advice and
Consent to Ratification, 1 HARv. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 227 (1988); Jordon J. Paust, Congress and
Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away With It, 11 MICH. J. INffL L. 90 (1989).
229. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?
21 BROOK. J. INTL L. 277 (1995).
230. International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
231. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. GA. Res. 39/46, Annex. 39, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51,
at 197 U.N. Doc. F/Cn. 4/1984/72 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
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have adopted what now seems to be a unanimous approach.
Their fervor, however, has since been challenged in observations
by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and it
appears to have met with a lukewarm reception in both the
International Law Commission and the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly. These observations leave the law in an
uncertain state at present, tempers somewhat the triumph of the
two treaties, and mitigates the vital protection that they provide
to women and children.
